

From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey Manifestations of Nationalisms and National Imaginations

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Abstract: Political views such as Ottomanism, Islamism and Turanism (Turkism) were experienced by Ottoman Empire in last and longest century in order to protect his integration better. Newborn Republic took over ideological legacy of the Ottoman Empire largely and transformed it with a new style. Nationalist ideology, that continues its evolution in anti-communist conjuncture during the Cold War, has again changed its imagination with emerging the problem of ethnic nationalism after the 1980s. The traces of nationalism, which has a particular goal but does not have a way that is exactly certain, are tried to be followed from the Ottoman to Turkey. We carefully elected some important actors and their perceptions in order to understand and compare better the reality of national cases.

Keywords: The Ottoman Empire, Republic of Turkey, Ottomanism, Islamism, culture, Turanism, Turkish Nationalism, reactional ethnic nationalism.



Osmanlı Devleti’nden Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne Milliyetçiliklerin ve Milli’lik Tasavvurlarının Tezahürleri

Öz: Son ve en uzun yüzyılında bütünlüğünü daha iyi korumayı hedefleyen Osmanlı Devleti tarafından, Osmanlıcılık, İslamcılık, Turancılık (Türkçülük) gibi siyasi görüşler tecrübe edildi. Yeni doğan Cumhuriyet, Osmanlı’nın ideolojik mirasını büyük ölçüde devraldı ve yeni bir tarz ile onu dönüştürdü. Soğuk Savaş döneminde evrimini komünizm karşıtı konjonktürde sürdüren milliyetçi ideoloji, 1980’lerden sonra etnik milliyetçilik sorununun da sahneye çıkmasıyla imajinasyonunu (tasavvurunu) bir kez daha değiştirdi. Bu makale ile hedefi belirli ancak yolu tam olarak belirli olmayan milliyetçilik ideolojisinin Osmanlı’dan Türkiye’ye bıraktığı izler takip edildi. Milli meselelerin gerçekliğinin anlaşılması ve mukayese edilebilmesi için bazı önemli aktörler ile onların algı ve görüşleri dikkate alınarak seçildi.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı Devleti, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Osmanlıcılık, İslamcılık, kültür, Turancılık, Türk Milliyetçiliği, reaksiyoner etnik milliyetçilik.

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Introduction

Some issues are difficult and complex by nature. Hence, to handle these issues with ordinary and classical approaches may not provide benefit. You need to shed light on issue to elaborate on it. The subject of nationalism is within the scope of this view as well. It requires a wide range of evaluation. Different matters and discourses that are not directly related each other could be offered together in the ideological style of nationalism. Rational nationalism has its own quest for a universal format. But this trend does not attract attentions in romantic nationalism. There can be different modellings from each other as much as the number of thinkers and authors. In this article, we tried to open a window for critical analysis to mention ideological attitude without any presupposition as much as possible. But we have to remember this basic question: *“Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?”*. Even if ideas that are put forward aren't in general literature, they are associated with the samples of public opinion. This article has been to provide a modest contribution to the subject with its pros and cons. And it also aims to contribute to the development of the common sense with an intellectual evaluation and a heart-searching. This method may break some people's routine who have not deep knowledge about nationalism. It could be described as a mental cross-border operation. For that reason alone, it carries a significant meaning.

Euro-centric ‘idea of enlightenment’ that focuses on the mind and human activities with the Renaissance and Reformation, leads to a very serious change and transformation in every parts of life. Scientific and technological developments re-shaped the social structure of the Western World, particularly Britain and France with the industrial revolution. Jointly American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Revolution (1789), Nationalism as a political current began to affect deeply the whole world especially Europe. The idea of nationalism, which is predominant in the UK as a Liberal-conservative character and in France as rational-constructionist features, emerged in Germany as a romantic nationalism. Nation-state nationalism, which evokes integration and mobilization, opened the horizon of thought in terms of sharing common icons, symbols and fate via educational institutions and the army. Nationalism, between communities having nation but not state and communities establishing state but trying to build nation, shows itself in different ways.

When we look at the discussion of nationalism that comes out from the late Ottoman period to the foundation of Republic and from the establishment of the Republic to present, it is possible to observe that; the ‘Romantic Nationalism’ approach takes place together with ‘Rational’ (Constructivist) approach in our country. However, the current situation, that has historical, social and cultural data, pursued a course to its own characteristics. It is possible to say that; the phenomenon of nationalism in our country has a content and scope of “sui generis”. This movement plays an important role on the collapse of

the Ottoman Empire for gaining power, demand and supporter among the non-Muslims. During the crisis period that is before and after World War I, this movement became visible in the form of Arab Nationalism. It is possible to say that: a lot of internal and external factors play a role on this situation. Turkish nationalism, which does not ignore the Islamic elements and is the western-oriented, was more effective than Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism which is called as 'üç tarz-ı siyaset' (three style of politics) (Akçura, 2008: 35). Even if the formula of Ziya Gökalp, who is from Diyarbakır, "the culture of Turks, Islamic religion, the Western civilization" (Gökalp, 1976: 19-63) seems eclectic character; it was very effective over Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the founders of Republic in the first period. Nevertheless, the newly established Republic of Turkey as a state of the Ottoman balance began to take shape in a completely different direction in terms of the ideology, attitudes and orientations. Even though changes and developments in the world – from Wilson Principles to the League of Nations at a wide range of organizations- have a key role on this configuration, internal political economic, social and cultural factors were also decisive. However, the action-reaction process, which is in the nature of nationalists, would show itself throughout the history of the Republic over time.

1. Measures against Western-Oriented Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire: Ottomanism

Erika Harris emphasizes that the idea of the nation is rooted in the Enlightenment. A French political thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) revealed some important political concepts as participation and citizenship. But it should be said that he did not put forward a nationalist doctrine. According to Harris his ideas could be accepted as a starting point. Rousseau's ideas were appeared in the French Revolution as Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. "*The ideas of unity of the people, political equality and freedom*" effected seriously and found voice in all national struggles. Hans Kohn argued that especially in the East (Eastern Europe, Middle East and Asia) nationalism arose within empires (including Ottoman Empire). And empires' boundaries were redrawn "*along ethno-geographic boundaries*" (Harris, 2009: 22-30).

Ethnical aspects of nationalism began to develop from the beginning of 19th century among the non-Muslims who are Ottoman subjects. There are two main factors that play a role on this situation. One of them is nationalism current that begin to spread all over Europe after French Revolution. Second factor is great powers' expansionist foreign policies which are around the orient issue.

In the Ottoman state, different nations and communities lived together. Kamouzis makes an interesting observation about this system (Millet Sistemi): "*the different communities would retain their communal rights and administrate themselves through local government under state control. This approach, combined with the promotion of liberal economic policies and the freedom of private enterprise, was indirectly supporting the nationalism of the non-Muslim*

communities. Their policies provided a fertile ground for the development of national separatism” (Kamouzis, 2013: 26). This is a very assertive determination in the context of practices.

In the Ottoman Empire, ulema, intellectuals who take form recently, bureaucrats and especially sultan try to respond to nationalisms with restructuring and reforms from the legal order to institutions particularly in the army.

Austria Ambassador Sadik Rifat Pasha and London Ambassador Mustafa Resit Pasha who is the architect of Tanzimat, supposed to eradicate culture units in Ottoman with an ‘Ottomanism’ awareness taking administrative, legal and economic measures in a national scale (Mardin, 1997: 12-13). While remedy is searched against multiple threats, there was a new Ottoman citizenship concept promising legal equality for everyone in the ‘Ottomanism’ doctrine that is raised to create a new sense of national commitment among Islamic concepts, reformist initiatives and Western nationalism. Even if this doctrine does not influence the Christian in Balkans, it creates great impact on Muslim population including Arabs (Fuller, 2008: 55-57). Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Pasha pointed out that; the element, which will have the task of unifying in Ottoman Empire, is Turks in 1862 (Sarıay, 2004: 48). *“Until the Balkan Wars, the population of the Ottoman Balkans was still 51 percent Muslim, including Albanians and others as well as Turks”* (Findley, 2010: 202). However, the loss of Rumelia, as a result of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan wars, brings about the bankruptcy of the ideology of Ottomanism (Sarıay, 2004: 131).

2. Abdulhamit II and His Efforts against the Fragmentation: Manifestation of Islamism

Abdulhamit II had thirty-three-year-long reign in the most difficult and complicated era of the Ottoman Empire among the numerous internal and external challenges threats and hazards (Karakoç, 2007: 13-14). Abdulhamit, who took a role model of technical, management system, the military organization and education of West, was trying to strengthen Islam among their subjects (Mardin, 1997: 15-16). At this point, he tried to gather all Muslim subjects under ‘common umbrella of Islam’ against the threats and hazards of ‘the separation of non-Muslims’ from the Ottoman Empire.

According to Abdulhamit, the English were sown the seeds of the idea of ‘nation, race’ with a harmful propaganda in many parts of the Ottoman land. Ottoman Empire was formed by Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks, Africans and many other elements. Abdulhamit indicates that the Caliphate emphasis should predate the Sultanate emphasis and says that faith love should take precedence of love of land (Abdülhamid, 1999: 133-138). Karpas highlights that Abdulhamit aims to modernize with Islamist policy and tries to determine the identity of the Muslim nations (Karpas, 2001: 71-73).

According to Serif Mardin, Abdulhamit's Islamism policy is not well understood. Islamism policy; begins to take shape before Abdulhamit and it is supported by Germans against the progress of Russians. It also rises as a secondary of the 'Pan-Nationalisms' which can be considered one of the extensions of social Darwinism that started to crystallize in Europe after 1870. Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856) brings about Pan-Slavism as the development of the ideal of a Russian. Abdulhamit activates Islam which gains ground among intellectuals in his country after Russian War and he organizes this tendency. The idea that Sultan is against any kind of nationalism is not true. Already the nationalist movement starts to consist in this era in Turkey. It tries to move with the idea that the bond of nationality may replace Islam (Mardin, 1997: 91-97).

It is observed that Abdulhamit emphasizes 'khan tradition' in old Turks whereas he tries strengthen ties with Islam which creates the establishment paradigm and basis of Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, he tries to adapt melting dominant western civilization's perceptions and practices of 'modernity' in his own authoritarian-conservative pot, and so he struggles to enforce and carry his conclusion to politics and society.

3. Understanding the Evolution of Turkish Nationalism

3.1. The Rise of Turkish Nationalism: Ittihat Terakki (The Union and Progress Party) and Turanism

Ottoman Empire was the representative of a civilization which identifies itself and its existence with Islam. A lot of different ethnic backgrounds and religious communities and nations lived together in this state. Ottoman did not emphasize Turkishness while it articulates itself. On the contrary, the word 'Turk' is used for 'ignorant Anatolian peasants' in the old Ottoman monuments until 19th century (Sarinay, 2004: 24).

According to Findley Ottoman was *"a multinational empire that was endangered by both separatist nationalism and European imperialism. Ottoman and Turkish forms of nationalism developed in response to that untenable situation"* (Findley, 2010: 9). Masami Arai asserts that firstly Western European-style nationalism affected the Ottoman Empire, afterwards Eastern European type nationalism began to affect the Ottoman Empire. At the same time the words 'race' and 'tribes' were included in discussions of nationalism. The movement of Turkish nationalism carries the traces of the continuity of the Ottoman patriotism in one way (Arai, 2008: 13-14).

Understanding the era of Young Turks has a key role on the development of Turkish nationalism. There are significant differences between Ottoman Turks who are effective in spreading the idea of nationalism and Turks emigrating from Russia. People in the latter group who have fought against Tsarist Russia before emigrating to the empire were nationalist leaders. An attractive Ottoman nation

idea was already available for people living in the Ottoman Empire. Ziya Gokalp showed Turkeyism, Oghuzism and Turanism as a target of Turkish nationalism. There are four magazines in this period; 'Türk Derneği', 'Genç Kalemler', 'Türk Yurdu' and 'İslâm Mecmuası' (Arai, 2008: 20-29). The noteworthy issue is that concepts in the debate in the journals of that period are grayed and perhaps are demonstrated open-ended format consciously. This is the reason of maintaining uncertainty and fog effects in the period of the rise of nationalism in Turkey with very different in size, scope and content.

It is difficult to talk about ideologies covering the Young Turks. Its cadres are affected by biological materialism and positivism as worldview. However, mentioning about Weltanschauung (world view) instead of mentioning about an ideology which contains ulema and people from many different qualifications would be more accurate (Hanioglu, 2000: 587). After the rejection the offer of the Young Turks who have a promise of equality for subjects from each religion by the minority nationalist; the Young Turks moved from 'Ottomanism' to 'Turkish nationalism'. They wanted to assimilate all ethnic groups in the Turkish state that they consider to establish (Shaw, 2008: 355).

Especially second constitutionalist period was a term that the 'Turan' idea gradually gained power. Now the Turks were looking for ancestors among world conquerors of Asian steppes; not among Islamic elders. This change was taken up to the last straw with the Republic. According to official history thesis, the Turks have constituted the history of humanity's oldest community and they have given first and largest examples of civilization (Güngör, 2005: 92). 'Turkic Themes/Myths' were brought to the fore throughout the later years of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Republic of Turkey. And origins of the Turks in Central Asia have been seen as an ideological tool to decrease the effects of the Islamic component in the heritage of the Turkish Republic (Fortna, 2011: 110).

Aydemir describes the 'pre-1908 period' of Ottoman Empire as a 'pre-nationalism period'. And he also thinks that "*Racial Union, Earth-country Union, Language and Culture Union, Wishes Union (the Union of Spirit and Idea) and the State Union; the ideal state occurs with all of them*" for ideal and imagined nation (Aydemir, 1993: 443-448). Nationalist idea goes so far at Aydemir; "*the Kaaba was not in Mecca, but was in Turan for young people. Public war was going in a strange spirit of contention*" (Aydemir, 1993: 493). Therefore, he tries to present his opinions, faith and ideology as a historical reality.

'İttihat and Terakki' that is the basic element of second constitution, evaluates a combination of West and powerfulness factor whereas it considers Gokalp's attitude which researches the social structure of the West and how they can be utilized, as opposed tendencies. According to Mustafa Kemal, West has been distinguished with the positive sciences and powerfulness (Mardin, 1997: 16-18). Mustafa Kemal was thinking differently about the future. Mango

emphasises this difference: “It is true that Atatürk had been a Unionist and that he worked with former Unionists throughout his life, but he saw the Young Turk leadership as setting an example to be avoided. Their foolishness – their adventurism which destroyed the Ottoman state and threatened to destroy the Turkish homeland as well” (Mango, 2010: 4-5).

3.2. From Gokalp to Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha: New Comment of Nationalism

In Turkey, nationalism began with Ziya Gokalp in the modern sense and his ‘Principles of Turkism’ book has been the foundation of the Republican revolution. Turkism was a name given to a movement that adopted by a group gathered around Rıza Nur’s opinions and his ideas rather than the ideas of Gokalp. Very serious struggles took place between Turkists and Revolutionaries. These struggles ended with Revolutionaries crushing Turkists with using the facilities of the state. One other struggle is between ‘Turkists’ and ‘Anatolianist’. Both movements receive their source from Gokalp. However, Turkists qualify the spread of Islam in Central Asia as the spread of Arab imperialism. Afterward, Rıza Nur abandoned this idea because of the fact that Islam is one of the main points of Turkish nationalism. Also, Revolutionaries try to show the period which is from entering the Turks to Islam to establishing the Republic as a ‘dark period of gap’ (Güngör, 2005: 134-135).

As a Kurdish-rooted Turkish scholar Ziya Gokalp is a Turkish reality with his paradoxes. He is the father of the idea of Turkism. He says that in his article about ‘Turks and Kurds’ in the *Küçük Mecmua* Journal (Convey from Gokalp, Tan, 2009: 187-190): “Turks and Kurds combine both materially and morally in the result of thousand year of common religion, common history, a common geography. They stand against the common enemies, common hazards. They only can get rid of this hazard with common determination... If there is a Turk who does not love Kurd, he is not Turk. If there is a Kurd who does not love Turk, he is not Kurd”.

Gokalp’s thoughts are still alive although a century has passed and still protect their importance. The reflection of the above-mentioned approaches in practice unfortunately is not expected properties.

Gokalp’s approach “I am from Turkish Nation, I am from Islamic Ummah and I am from West Civilization” was very effective especially during the period of the Independence War and I. Parliament. Maybe Gokalp’s early death, but rather the internal and external political, social, economic and cultural factors transport the nationalist movement and ideology to very different dimensions. Representing the official discourse of nationalism, perceiving and interpreting in the eyes of audience produce itself with different colors and shades in a wide range. Nearly every world view and ideology, even every scientific community’s own nationalism identification is discussed.

The idea of Islamism which is in Gokalp's nationalist understanding called "to Turkishization, to convert to Islam and to modernize", puts aside due to the fact that Turkey is not the leader of the Islamic world and to survive as an independent state identity against West that pull down this world with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (Güngör, 2005: 89-90). In addition to westernization and modernization, the founder of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal internalized secularism and found the influence of religion in politics and personal lives negative (Erickson, 2013: 58).

When the Republic of Turkey establish, nation and state-building process which is a trend in international community, is realized by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his friends. Now, everyone was equal and had become a citizen of the republic. Turkish term using by Europeans was activated as a common identity to describe the identity of the Muslims living in Anatolia. This term (Turk) encompasses all the others. It covered Kurds and all other ethnic elements living in Turkey (Volkan, 2010).

The founders of the Republic of Turkey undertook a series of reforms in accordance with their vision for society. New Turkish State's vision was a strictly homogeneous nation that "would speak one single language¹, think and feel alike (The quotation is from a speech that Sukru Kaya, the minister of the interior, gave in parliament in 1934)". The new vision was the result of "the lessons that the founders of the Turkish Republic took from the rapid disintegration of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire" (Aslan, 2015: 31-32).

According to Mufti, when building a new identity and establishing a new state step by step, Mustafa Kemal's aim was clear: "to create a republic strong enough to defend, and developed enough to hold its own technologically and culturally" and "to avoid the frequently fatal tension between imperial ambition and imperial heterogeneity" (Mufti, 2009: 17-18).

Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha realized adapting to Turkey in the context of cyclical perform watching carefully a paradigmatic transformation in the world.

3.3. Different Nationalist Activities in Republic Period

In Turkey, as in many other countries, nationalism has emerged with the establishment of the nation-state. Nationalism has manifested in the form of a late adaptation that modernization and civilization convenient with the features of the French Revolution. Official Turkish nationalism gets out in a nebula which is molded by different social dynamics and different types of nationalism and nation designs. During the Republican period in the formation of national identity in Turkey, some factors such as ethnocentric civilizations, xenophobia, citizen-identity, cultural and biological racism has been effective. Turkish nation

¹ According to O'Driscoll, "Turkish nationalism has similar policies to Fichte's Volkism". Fichte says, 'wherever a separate language is found, there a separate nation exists' (O'Driscoll, 2014: 270-271).

‘a world history nation’ which is plagiarized term from Hegel’s concept of historicity world has been formulated in the form and synthesized western civilization and national culture. Turkish race will refresh Asia like Germanic race refresh the European (Bora, 1998: 13-36).

Struggle of a nation which has survived a major trauma (situation before and after World War I) and is defeated and broken the national pride with itself and entering into a settlement is an inevitable process to make its existence possible in objective and subjective dimensions. Shaking the fundamental paradigms of civilization and culture, so new paradigm which is unknown its essence and content is tended and practices and actions are exhibited around this paradigm. Folks were introduced to a change and intervention process with a belief about patients with cancer can be surgically recovered taking a revolutionary, radical attitude instead of reformer attitude since the Tanzimat. But the cultural and social structure face suitability crisis for admission social engineering designs and overcoming this crisis coming to the level of normalization has not been possible up to a new world war. More natural and humane medical interventions have started to replace surgical interventions after World War II.

The end of WW II indicated the beginning of major political change in Turkey. *“The new political circumstances of the time, which included the transition to democracy and attacks on the Communists’ atheism—opened new public spaces for those from religiously conservative circles who had been silenced and often ignored since the mid-1920s”* (Bein, 2011: 136).

Although partially excluded from the official ideology after and before WW II, Turkic-Turanist current began to formulate itself with expression of Nihal Atsız *“the Turk is a person who comes from Turkish lineage”*. Speaking Turkish does not seem enough to being Turk. Atsız uses ‘foreigners as Turk’ expression about Albanians, Kurds, Circassians, Laz, Arabs. According to Atsız; *“...Arabs already are traitors as tribes... Primitive two million Kurds are a very backward and primitive department of Persians... They, who establish neither the state nor civilization, are an uncultured and underdeveloped congregation... Either you melt in Turkishness, accept it or you are destroyed”* (Convey from Atsız, Bora, 2007: 94-95).

If we look carefully at the text above, how a Turkey is brought into this situation better understood. Social origins and psychological profiles of people who put forward the kinship and blood, is an investigatable topic.

Mehdi Zana who was Diyarbakır Municipality prior to September 12, 1980 gives place to Turanist Nihal Atsız’ pejorative statement which led to the tremendous response in Kurdish circles appearing in Ötüken Journal, in his recollections. Frustration, suppressions, exclusion and scorned are basic parameters of needed figure of ‘enemy’ to the formation of opposed nationalist

feelings and thoughts. Zana tells in his recollection broadly that the prohibition and blocking of the use of the Kurdish language plays role on the formation of nationalist identity (Zana, 1991: 87-165). Satana asserts that *“many would argue that the increasing resentment among the Kurds against the state was a consequence of both failed assimilation policies and limited opportunities for access to political and economic power”* (Satana, 2012: 172).

One of the original nationalist ecoles in Turkey is the way of Nurettin Topcu. He lays bare his opinions in ‘Hareket’ journal and his other works. With the influence of Huseyin Avni Ulas and Remzi Oguz Arik, –Anatolianism- opinion grounded on Topcu who returns to hometown completing his PhD at the Sorbonne. He said that Nationalism cannot be separated from Islam and nation and religion are intertwined concepts. According to Topcu; *“this land generates the people of this nation. Children of this country who are unaware of this fact are tired chasing a dream such as Islamism which is separated from lineage and homeland and Turanism which flees homeland. Each of them deluded the destiny of the country in an era.”* ‘Anatolianism’ is mentioned by Necip Fazil Kısakurek (the way of Büyük Doğu), Ahmet Kutsi Tecer and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (Topçu, 1978: 5-22).

The one of the most fundamental actors of romantic nationalism in Turkey is undoubtedly has been Necip Fazil. Necip Fazil following expression is striking in terms of showing the inspiration for nationalism in Turkey: *“Muslim Turk! I greet you with love in the light of this quality which ties sky to earth and ore to coal! Now, air may open with the eyes of matter there and may close everywhere. But surely it should be known that, Muslim-Turk indicates the only country where sun not passing over within the framework of their state”* (Kısakürek, 2009: 106). Necip Fazil presents self-styled solution idealist-raiders tension being effective in nationalist-right circles in the 1970s. He evaluates National Turkish Students Union including raiders as a brain and heart center, Nationalists community as the potential energy and moves (Kısakürek, 2009: 48-56).

S. Ahmet Arvasi has been the most discussed and assessed opinion leader with the ‘Turkish-Islamic ideal’ line in nationalist circles. He, from the family of Arvasi in Van, thinks that saying Turkish-Islamic ideal would be more appropriate than saying Turkish-Islamic synthesis. He represents that salvation will come with a generation who has Islam, faith, love and action and will bring their nation to number one state in the world with technological possibilities (Arvasi, Volume 1, 2009: 11-20).

Atila İlhan asserts that; the aim of his work ‘Ulusal Kültür Savaşı’ (National Culture War) is hundred million Turkey which is developed in every respect, has completed heavy industry, is independent, has national interests in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. According to İlhan, the rest is sophistication; debate must be done on purpose but not on the vehicle.

Formation of this depends on a solid culture ground. In the words of Mustafa Kemal; *"culture is symmetric with ground, this ground is moral quality"* (İlhan, 2005: 23-26). Solution is reaching a national combination; this actualizes with national consciousness, national consciousness can occur with history consciousness (İlhan, 2005: 47-49).

Differentiation which is effective on solidarist-corporatist elements Turkish nationalism from the 1940s was observed. After World War II anti-communist movement has led to the popularization of nationalist tendencies. The links between 'Turkism' and 'Islam' is begun to emphasize with the statement of Alparslan Türkeş "We are Turk as far as mount Tanrı (God), we are Muslim as far as mount Hira". This bond establishing between Islam and Turkishness resemble to established relation by Atatürk during liberty war. Islam has 'a tool' position to strengthen and support Turkishness. Gökalp's Turkish-Islamic synthesis ideals which express backing to understanding of the synthesis began to be mentioned from the 1980s (Karakaş, 2006: 70-75).

3.4. The New Dimensions of Nationalism after 1980: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

After the military coup on 12 September 1980, the Turkish General Staff (junta) put *"combating the hold of 'foreign' ideologies such as socialism, communism or Islamic fundamentalism over the Turkish youth"* on the top of its agenda. *"Although the military suppressed the leftist and Islamist movements mercilessly, they also realized that an ideological alternative was needed and that traditional secularist Kemalism had too limited an appeal to be able to do the job... (and) they turned to the ideas of the 'Hearths of the Enlightened' (Aydınlar Ocakları)."* Essential of its ideology was 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis', which was developed by its first president, İbrahim Kafesoğlu. It was *"the idea that Islam and the pre-Islamic culture of the Turks displayed a great number of similarities"* (Zürcher, 2010: 280-281). Former chairman of Hearths of the Enlightened Prof.Dr.Süleyman Yalçın states that in the introduction of Kafesoğlu's 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' book, said thinker from 'Romantic Turkism Era' in the 1970-1980 year proceeds to 'Cultural Nationalism' stage which is more advanced and scientific level (Kafesoğlu, 2008: 9-10).

'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis', which walks together with 'Atatürk nationalism' in official discourse occurs in Turkey after 1980 (especially after the military coup). In this respect, the Turkish-Islamic ideal or the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis began to create the main body of nationalist movements after 1980 in both in theory as well as practice. Undoubtedly, social crisis of the pre-coup, chaos and terror atmosphere have been a great impact on this situation. At the same time, rising star in the world in the US's Reagan, in the Britain's Thatcher and 'new conservatism' have an important contribution.

Geopolitical environment and the strategic priorities have changed with the end of the Cold War. Gulf War contributed to appear Turkey as an actor which is international axes. The main element that triggers the rising nationalist backlash in Turkey, is rebellion based on political violence under the leadership of the PKK. In fact, a strong sense of Turkish nationalism has always been dominant the Kemalist vision in conjunction with the country's modernization and Westernization. Nationalist backlash in Turkey becomes increasingly powerful with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the Turkish Republic, after the Gulf War experience and disappointed in Turkey's relations with the European Union. Turkish nationalism locates itself in a broader framework which is from tradition to modernity and in this point; it feeds from distrust toward the West. In shaping the future, Turkey's external role and Ankara's relations with its Western allies will play a decisive role with the changing roles of government and private sector, nationalist tendencies, arising from the tension between the modern and the traditional opinions for issues of identity (Khalilzad, Lesser and Larrabe, 2001: 7-22).

4. Different National Perceptions and Approaches in Turkey

4.1. From pre-Modern Times to post-Modern Period Ahmed-i Hani's Authentic Approach

One of the different approaches in this article is Ahmed-i Hani's. Today, too much emphasis is laid on Hani in ethnic-oriented Kurdish nationalist literature. He has an Islamic-oriented Kurdish identity and belonging. He aims a cultural-based revival, acceptance and recognition. He puts forward his ideas and views with a unique discourse in parallel to 'Divine Love Approach' (İlahi Aşk Yaklaşımı).

In view of the discussion of nationalism in Turkey, one of the works that will bring historical depth is Ahmed-i Hani's work 'Mem-u Zin'. Hani qualifies prophet Mohammed that *"He is a window opening to the beauty of God, is a sun shining dark heart."* and he says: *"He overrules all religions and nationalities, puts away all patients and diseases."* (Hani, 2010: 12). Hani starts the fifth chapter of his book with *"it is about statement of their bravery and zeal with praise the Kurdish tribes, their laziness with their misfortune and the mark of their generosity and patriotism."* Even only this statement illustrates that Hani has an objective and critical view. Also, in this section; He says: *"I've astonished at the wisdom of Allah, Kurds in world state... which reason deprives them? Why they all are doomed?"*... However, the essential point in the book is trans journey from love to divine love (Hani, 2010: 203).

In view of the phenomenon of nationalism which has become today's burning problems, may be a solution to create a new perception in terms of spreading center-periphery relations. Cultural readings which are directed to the future's bright horizon are needed. In this context, perceiving Hani as 'Mevlana'

who write Kurdish Divan, making universal common denominator, both provides benefit in the solution of representation crisis with soft power, and causing for creating peaceful atmosphere against the blow of the traumatic syndrome of Nationalism.

4.2. Said-i Nursi's (Bediuzzaman) Discourse Analysis: Trying to Establish a Powerful Cultural Bridge among Muslim Societies

Said Nursi's approach to nationalism problematic has the characteristics of a constructive contribution to integration and integrative efforts in large-scale Islamic field. Because of the ideas have been put forward by wise men like Hâni and Nursi, today ethnic-based reactionary nationalism hasn't reached completely their targets. It will be richness to argue these issues in academic studies especially thesis. We aimed to add value to academic field with handling these issues in the context of cultural studies.

An Islamic Scholar Said-i Nursi who led to very serious effects and consequences for shaping the public with his opinions, thoughts, ideas and actions, has looked nationalism in the context of positive and negative nationalism. Because of the fact that Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, Albanian, Circassian and Laz are Muslim in the scope of positive nationalism, he emphasizes that Islam succeeds in making a single nation without interfere with their nationality. He gives Emevis breaking down Islamic World as an example of negative nationalism. He points out that the major thing is servicing to God. He sees natural the relation of nation with their languages. He points the damage of racism and states that real Turkism and Turk are Turkishness soluble in Islam. He says that the Turks are Muslims everywhere, people who are away from Islam, also move away from Turkishness. He shows an interest in people of the region due to the fact that he is from Bitlis. He makes an effort for establishment and strengthening of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood. He stresses the services of the Muslim Turks to Islam all the time and everywhere (Mürsel, 1995: 231-249). He indicates that a great mischief, mischief and anarchy emerge in case of a moving away from real Islamic brotherhood.

A question was asked to him about the 31 march incident; "Which Kurdish tribe you're from?", he replies; "*I am Ottoman, my Kurdishness is because of place where I was born and I grew up there.*" (Kutay, 1978: 42). It is understood from these words that Said-i Nursi is a representative of the common good, common wisdom and the collective conscience in a constructive, rehabilitative attitude without denying his own identity and personality. Also, Şerif Mardin says in his book about Said-i Nursi that "*there is nothing to justify accusations that he is a Kurdish nationalist against him*" (Mardin, 1993: 141).

According to Çancı, "Said Nursi is invited to give a speech in the rostrum of parliament when Turkey Grand National Assembly in Ankara opens in the first days and he advices about what should be attitude towards the people from

East and Southeast addressing staff establishing the state. According to Nursi, the focal spot of common point is formed by religion for the solution of the problem of Kurdish and Turkish people (Çancı, 1998: 254-257).

Eşref Edip who is unforgettable name in Sebil-ür-Reşad Journal which is very effective in the process of transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey says that “... purpose is known!... Tarnishing him in the eyes of the public opinion... Yes he is from Kurdish descent which is life, patriotism and religious brothers of Turk. He is from descent of the great warrior Saladin-i Eyyübi...” (Conveyer Badıllı, 1990: 40).

Present social conditions have excessive nationalism emphasis which puts forward ethnic origin bellyful. However, it is possible to say that being nation in history and the future based on common will, faith and reason beside ethnic origin. At this point, Bediüzzaman Said-i Nursi reinforces the Turkish, Kurdish and Arab brotherhood with charismatic personality and his works.

4.3. Erbakan and National Vision Movement: Uprising of a New Islamic Political Actor

Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan who is elected to the presidency of Turkey Union of Chambers as a representative of small and medium-sized businessmen against the capital owners undoubtedly has been one of the most effective political actors in 1968. Religious, Islamic references always have been at the forefront in his political studies taking into account modern democratic legal framework (Çakır, 1990: 214-215).

One of the most striking illustration about the qualification of ‘national vision movement’ is the following words in his TRT election speech in March 1989: “The opinion that respects the values and history of our nation is national vision. National Vision means its own opinion of our nation. National vision is faith in the heart of Sultan Fatih while he conquers İstanbul. Our nation was dominated world by the National vision thousand years. Remedy of all our today's problems is the National vision” (Conveys from Erbakan; Uçar, 2000: 77).

Diyarbakır State Security Court showed his speech in Bingöl as a cause of the closure of the Welfare Party before the local elections of 1994. Erbakan is punished a year in prison and 22,000 liras heavy money. This conversation shows that Erbakan is politics banned during lifetime. “When sons of the country start school, they started to bismillah for centuries, you remove bismillâh. What did you put in its place? ‘I am a Turk, I am a right, I am a hardworking...’ when you say that, on the other hand a Muslim people who are descendent of Kurd get right to say: ‘So I am righter, I am more hardworking’.” (Conveys from Erbakan; Çalmuk, 2000: 430-431).

It is said that despite the reduction in the relative activity Erbakan’s politics in the 2000s, coming to power phenomenon his students with a different

political tendency formed as a result of ‘the resultant vector’ including very elements such as domestic and international political, social, economic and cultural.

4.4. An Oscillation between Rational and Romantic Strategies in National Coherence: Bulent Ecevit and the Democratic Left Movement

Mustafa Bulent Ecevit who has served in the highest levels of government in Turkey has a separate position. He was a unique name that does not neglect the element of religion between Atatürk’s nationalism and democratic-left line after September 12, carries idiosyncratic ‘nationalist synthesis’ on the agenda of politics and society, with his thinker identity, his poetry and his politician identity. Firstly, Ecevit who is criticized about that a link cannot be established between nationalism and leftism started to put forward his popularity and political legitimacy with developments after 1990. Ecevit was a leader attracting attention with his populism prior to 1980. He had transformed the format of Kemalist staff’s ‘Despite the public for the public’ to ‘for the public with the public’. Making social justice, humane and equitable order a part of a project of democratic-left, nationalism of the right and patriotism of the left are converted to populist modernization in the personal of Ecevit. Ecevit came into prominence with the approach of Kemalism, Turkishness and especially economic nationalism. Also, he has not neglected criticizing MHP’s understanding of nationalism. He has developed reconciliation attitude in his opinion in the tense atmosphere of the February 28. He has contributed to the paradigm of indivisible integrity of the state and the nation (Dönmez and Bico, 2008: 448-453). Ecevit who no one doubted about his Kemalism, has contributed to historical reconciliation and peace in the public of Turkey, reviving the thesis that Vahdettin is not traitor.

Bulent Ecevit who is one of nearly a half-century acting actor of Turkey’s political life managed to keep its place on the agenda with democratic outlets and unique description.

4.5. A Civil Smiling Man in Military Core of State: A Revolutionary War of Ozal’s in Conservative Manner

Turkey’s opening to the world and the global integration policy, with facing a free market economy breakthrough based on the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms from a closed country and community structure, had occurred with increasing momentum after 1980, and from especially since Turgut Ozal. With the way of dialogue and reconciliation, Turkey primarily solves its internal problems with reasonable ways. After, it may turn into both economic and political power center backing Ottoman balance nationalities. Ozal stressed that Turkishness emphasis in the Ottoman Empire has not ethnic meaning and is not considered outside of Islam. He clearly states that becoming Kurdish issue inextricable results from wrong policies and

practices in republican period. Ozal clearly express the following thesis since 1988 (Özal, 1992: 5-20): *Turkish, Kurdish, Albanian, Bosnian who are earlier Ottoman citizens and also those left behind after we leave that country, are cognate of our present citizens. They are people who are outside our borders and to a degree that interests us. I told that when I get Pesmarga to Turkey. How are we concern with the Turks in Bulgaria, we have to concern with Kurds in Syria.*

Former President Ozal who is seen as the concrete representative of liberal quest in many areas in Turkey evaluates the Kurdish issue as the guy who pierced the official policy of the state. While he maintains the fight against the terrorist organization, on the other hand he was sitting at the negotiating table with Kurds elders in Turkey and in northern Iraq. And while returning from the Southeast trip he said that *"I will certainly solve Kurdish issue"* and emphasized that, 'this will be the last service to his nation' (Akçura, 2009: 247-252).

His early and unexpected death plays role on Turkey's nationalism debate not getting out from the vicious world. This politician who does not think black and white, but 'sights the big game gray areas', has led to a rethinking of Turkey's image and position in the world.

In fact, that Turkey's issues cannot be tackled separately from developments in the world and it will be seen that discussion of nationalism is included that. Nationalism is moving towards a different direction in today's world. New factors are effective on nationalism such as the disintegration of the USSR and the process of globalization. Globalization affects the movement and mobility of human beings. *"As Benedict Anderson has acutely observed, the crucial document of twenty-first-century identity is not the nation-state's birth certificate, but the document of international identity-the passport"* (Hobsbawm, 2007: 83-88). Paradoxically globalization stimulates *"the proliferation of sub-groupism"*. *"The rise of ethnicity"* and *"the surfacing of new loyalties"* are related to globalization (McGrew, 1996: 92).

5. Challenges and Opportunities on National Matters in Turkey: the Emergence of Ethnic Nationalism

Modernity displays some difficult and different social problems. Nowadays, in all countries much or less people face some radical or extremist movement including ultra-national currents. From traditional attitudes to modern state phenomenon could have been seen lability situations due to several reasons.

Against the general trend which accepts nationalism as a modern phenomenon, Anthony D. Smith suggests a new approach in his book *"The Ethnic Origins of Nations"*. According to Smith, historical roots of the modern nationalism could be understood in the context of ethnic background. Smith argues that *"there have, indeed, been important changes within collective units and sentiments, even changes of form; but these have occurred within a pre-*

existing framework of collective loyalties and identities, which has conditioned the changes as much as they have influenced the framework" (Smith, 1996: 13). Especially Anthony Smith's different and unique approach that revealed in his book 'The Ethnic Origins of Nations' is important to note here. In the societies like ours which are heart over head, historical readings of nationalism is necessary.

Feroz Ahmad emphasizes that the founders of Turkey were aware of "the difference in meaning and chose their words with care". When they found the republic in 1923, "they were careful to call it the Republic of Turkey, a territorial and therefore a patriotic description, and not the Turkish Republic, which would have defined the republic ethnically" (Ahmad, 2003: ix). But as a matter of fact, The Turkish Republic originate in a secular nationalist movement. "State building was guided by an ideology wary of Islamic religious observance and non-Turkish ethnic identities" (Levitt and Ciplak, 2012: 456).

There was Kurdish identity in Turkey with other Muslim ethnic minority identities (Arabic, Circassian, Laz). From the Ottoman period to the founding of the Republic, "there is no evidence of widespread support for Kurdish nationalism" on the ground (social base) in eastern/southeastern Anatolia. "For the Kurds, identity continued to be defined through tribe, family, and religion rather than any concept of nation. Moreover, most of the Kurds were devout Sunni Muslims and, even if they felt little allegiance to the Ottoman state, were loyal to the sultan in his capacity as caliph" (Jenkins, 2008: 88). Ismet Pasha said in conference of Lausanne in 23 February 1923 that "Kurds are not different from Turks in any way and although speaking different languages, they constitute a whole in terms of races, beliefs and traditions." (Minorsky, Bois, 2008: 76). In fact, this idea summarized the basic approach in the minds of the founders of the Republic. However, progress and events followed very different way.

According to Erol Kurubaş who prepares a thesis 'International Dimensions of the Kurdish issue and Turkey', three main elements has played a role in taking an international dimension of the Kurdish issue: "first of all is Turkish nationalist movement and the Republic of Turkey, second element is Kurdish movement and the another is largest states, especially Britain and the international system. Therefore, the international dimension of the Kurdish problem in Turkey confronts as a subject that arising from the cross and reciprocal relationship between these three elements." (Kurubaş, 2004: 199-203). Kurubaş again took place in shaping and conflict of different Kurdish policies which belong to at least three centers including Germany, EU and Russia and US after the end of the Cold War. Kurdish movement that based on Marxist-Leninist class-based discourse until the 1990s, adopted democracy and human rights discourse after the collapse of the USSR. It tried to research demand, encourage, support and strength in the internal and external public opinion with inside; politicization process having ethnic character and outside; the representation of a grievance

and conviction on the human rights dimension (Kurubaş, 2004: 349-352).

The desperate side bringing to terror dimension, of cases which appear as sometimes ethnic nationalist character, sometimes socialist lines in the East and Southeast led to a very serious explosion that is mixture of reaction, anger, hatred in Turkish public opinion. Increasing acceleration of terrorism from the 1990s brought about increasing the martyr funerals. These issues have been completely dominant on Turkey's agenda with the introduction of politics. At this point, the sensitivity of the people was also activated in 'national reflex format' as a tool of the public relations policy and as a propaganda tool. As long as the congestion of the political system deepens, revenge demonstration emptying national reflexes, lynching movements, sometimes in a symbolic warning to the enemies and threats began to be institutionalized as a background which is 'legitimized crisis management' in the form of national hysteria seizure (Bora, 2007: 197-198).

Today, Turkey faces with a serious problem that is from economics to politics, from social relations to image in international arena. The three basic attitudes which take themselves naming of problem as a title can be mentioned: first of all is 'Kurdish problem', the second is 'Southeast Problem', the third is 'Terrorism'. If it is said in the words of the common text of the peace initiative for Kurdish issue, "A problem cannot be solved if it is not spoken and debated with all details. If speaking of problem is prohibited and pressure is applied for its solution, possible peaceful and civilized solution ways and reconciliation opportunities have been destroyed (Bostancı, 1999: 95-96). People who define this problem as an 'area dispute' use socio-economic perspective in their analysis and they point out the form of land ownership, feudal relations, low-income as a hindering factor of social integration and living standards. Also they state that; there are applications which will solve the problem of 'government and private sector investment to be realized in the region, being middle class and urbanization' in the medium term. In addition to this, people who define this problem as 'terrorism' show 'stimulation of external enemy' as the main reason and they say that; external environment that do not want the growth and development of Turkey aim to reduce the country's competitiveness in international platforms creating political and economic instability. Those who look for ethnic or nationalist phenomena or economic reasons at the root of the problem are mistaken. Both elements are resistance that is used to form basis at least in certain settings by the terrorist attempt (Bostancı, 1999: 97-98).

Results of research called 'Otherness as a common identity in Turkey' reveals interesting data and findings for Turkey. In this research carrying out by Eğitim-Bir Sen Strategic Research Center counseling Yasin Aktay, "How would you describe yourself first degree as a political identity?" question is asked. According to results, question is responded as 22.8% democrats, 22.6% nationalists. Kemalism 10.8% and Islamism 9.7% are identified. Also, there is

another question is “How would you describe yourself first degree as a cultural identity?”. Interestingly 52.6% participants as Turk, 32.9% participants as Muslim replied. According to the research, while a very large part of the Kurds chose their cultural identity as a Muslim in the primary level, rate of those who describe themselves as Kurds in the primary level stayed below the rate of the general population of Kurds. A great majority (86.7%) of those who identify itself as a Turks in primary level responded Islam as a secondary identity. About Alevism, 53.1% participants state that the Alevi-Sunni conflict is impossible. According to Aktay, this survey shows that perception of identity in Turkey has more permanent features (Aktay, 2010).

According to Goltz, in spite of the AKP’s Reforms (2002-2006) which “created a climate in Turkey that allows a more controversial discussion of the country’s future political shape, which will reflect the plural character of its society”, in the bureaucracy “a strongly nationalist concept which denies the existence of different ethnic or religious groups”, still continues to prevail (Goltz, 2006: 175).

In today’s political life “the party leaders often used an unprincipled populist nationalism to serve their electoral campaigns and day-to-day politics. Many of them had recourse to Islam or Islamism for the same purpose.” According to Kieser this is a fact that “the idolization of Turkishness and its leaders provoked the non-Turkish citizens, particularly the Kurds; privileges for the Sunnis entailed discrimination against other confessions, particularly the Alevis” (Kieser, 2006: xi).

The fault lines in the social structure of Turkey emerge in Turkish/Kurdish, Alevi/Sunni, Islamist/secular axes. However, Islam could be considered with reasons stemming from history which it is seen integration and guarantee of unity.

According to Kurubaş, ethnic issues can be overcome with state in point giving up its repressive and assimilationist approach, respect for human rights and democratization without damaging the unity and integrity. At the same time, the foreign states should not be used as ‘Sword of Damocles’ to the state in point. The ethnic group must understand that the sole remedy of the freedom does not pass through divisive acts (Kurubaş, 2004: 355-356). Today’s Turkey should establish a balancing system to protect “its own citizens from terrorism (when) maintaining international Human Rights standards” (Alexander, Brenner and Krause, 2008: 9).

Mustafa Akyol gives place a very striking and illuminating findings in his work ‘Rethinking the Kurdish problem’ (Akyol, 2006: 11-19): “The Kurds are one of the most ancient peoples of the Middle East. Turkey must think debate and find solution for this issue. Otherwise, PKK appropriates the Kurdish issue. Muslim bond which integrates Kurds and Turks throughout history can strengthen the spirit of unity smoothing ethnic nationalism on both sides. If this issue is solved, Turkey has

the opportunity of empowerment in its foreign policy in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Balkans and Europe. Adverse scenario is Turkey meeting with disaster of Balkanization like in the 19th century and disaster of Yugoslavization like at the end of the 20th century. It must get even with the past and must take lesson from history”.

Turks and Kurds are real and noble elements of this country. Dialectical vision of existence of Turkey in this land over 1000 years is shaped. From 1071 Malazgirt victory well known by the public, they shared a common history, destiny, worry and happiness. About 10 thousand volunteers from the Kurdish tribes settled in Diyarbakır had also participated in Alparslan’s army including 55 thousand people (Akyol, 2006: 24-25). Accidental events that occur from time to time must be evaluated in company with general social fluctuations and economic crisis rather than submitting a systematic wholeness. However, each community must revive common basic paradigm which constitutes ‘we awareness’ according to today’s requirements. Akyol transfers Graham Fuller’s statement: “It is very difficult to show that there is no another group which integrates in the world like Kurds who are integrated to Turkey” (Akyol, 2006: 199).

According to Kirisci and Winrow: “Some Kurds in Turkey (they may have important task in management) may not want to leave from the Turks because of perceiving themselves as Turks due to integration and assimilation. Some individuals perceive themselves as both Turkish and Kurdish. Therefore, the Kurds are not considered as a homogeneous ethnic group.” Hence, ‘multiculturalism’ seems a better solution way than ‘common communal’ in the solution of this problem (Kirişçi and Winrow, 2010: 218-222).

If we look closely, it will be seen that ‘nationalism’ cannot simply be rejected as “an old-fashioned” political ideology. It is still effective in Turkey and in the World. But, “nationalism can no longer be used as a social strategy” (Karskens, 2004: 270).

Finally today, service to hardworking and productive a positive nation getting out a vicious cycle of ethnic nationalism in Turkey, objective criteria of nationalism in the culture medium are presented suspending imaginary fiction. It should not be entered into ‘Black hole’ of Negative nationalism.

Conclusion

Countries’, nations’ and people’s perception of nationalism is directly related to their historical, social and cultural experiences. Rational self-interest and cooperation-oriented economic factors are also influential in modern nationalism approach. ‘Nationalisms’ expression is very important to evaluate problem/syndrome of nationalism. There is not a single prototype of nationalism. Even if dominant trend in the literature is generally based on an assumption that nationalisms are modern phenomenon, it could be said that this

issue is not what it looks like as it seen in new approaches more clearly. There is an ethnic core of nations which has been not clearly seen at first sight. 'Prima Facie' valuable possibilities in social life may not be true in real life. So we have to focus on real dynamics of social positions to solve and conclude conflicts and tensions between people. Sometimes we need to find out some new ways of thinking to reach our goals. By means of this way we can facilitate hard choices of national obstructions.

When we look at the historical process of nationalism discussion in Turkey, a great similarity to France is observed on the basis of State / Republic / citizenship - in terms of expansions after Republic and revolution during Republic period. In fact, the principle of secularism in Turkey is discussed for transformed into bylaw in an earlier period in France (1937). Jacobean administration and decisiveness of elitist approach are parallel phenomena with France. However, philosophy and social culture in Turkey follow a way which is near to German nationalist *ecole* in ideological plan. Constituting individuals and civil society and the formation of the nation has progressed in this direction. It is considered an appropriate attitude with that special status of Turkey does not transfer directly from any other nation and just looking it perform its own internal evolution according to their requirement. Because the same time, Turkey continued its versatile relations with the UK and US and the big northern neighbor Russia and it did not break off with around Muslim countries.

Turkey heir of the Ottoman Empire which is an imperial and great power and turned Mediterranean Sea to 'Mare Nostrum' (our sea), tended to bring a solution in the context of modernization to its government and international system-oriented crisis with republican experience. While Republic was trying to strengthen itself as ideology, also, it tried to guarantee itself politically and ideologically against a potential raid that may come opposition paradigm. At this point, defeat and invincibility constituted the main elements of the legitimacy of the modernity project in one sense. To accomplish this, it attempted to treat surgically the past which is considered as the sample of parenchyma but with the self-reproduction of the social fabric and culture, it brought itself in the a consultant position satisfying with the medical care. It activated material and moral resources in the direction of social mobilization incorporating history, culture and geography background to process.

In this context, it is pointed out that Turkey's 'ideological transformation' evolves from 'statist-elitist' coterie to 'traditionalist-liberal' pioneer group. While state-rescue process is ended, nation building process is laid foundation. At this point, it will be clearly seen that we do not live in a historical period which is deprived of traditional/modern or postmodern ideology. However, changes take place in the authoritarian and patriarchal character of ideology and these changes are also seen in the coast of Turkey with the world.

The process of coming into power the Democratic Party in 1950 and AKP in 2002 is evaluated by Karpat as that public restricts state ideology and the nation effort to bring it into conformity with self-identity and culture accord in the context of the history of democracy. In this context, the post-2002 process is called purgation from ideology (Karpat, 2004-2005: 31-37). Although in fact Karpat's approaches has integrity, it is possible to say that hard and rigid face of ideologies is soften and an ideological evolution that brings nation to forefront occurred in state-oriented ideologies, if conservatism and liberalism is considered as an ideology.

In this article our preferences based upon a broad scanning. Because of the nationalist reductive interpretation which includes sectional style people cannot accept and recognize each other and this manner inhibit an exact solution in a society. This issue goes on over a century. For this period, we handled some leaders and thinkers who bring a common sense to society. They remind us just a little bit mountaintops of national movements. Traditional nationalist tendencies of Ottoman State transformed towards the secular-oriented nationalism of the Turkish Republic. It could be seen to take an acceptance and high level of the legitimacy on the international area after the Independence War of Turkey (Milli Mücadele). Democratization process and its transformation into nationalize state were realized by force of historical, international and social conditions. The lack of the perception and vision of nationalism was real effect of ongoing problems in political life of Turkey. Without reading the cultural codes and inflexibility were the main reasons of the uprising of the ethnic-based reactionary nationalism in Turkey after 1980's. Today, it can be cooperated with the importance of the beliefs, tradition and knowledge. To considerate and enrich them with a cultural and humanitarian reading is an inevitable. What we need to do on this stage is consenting to social differences and cultural colors in order to sustain their presence with a pluralist, comprehensive and integrative method. A great social reconciliation will come up with restructuring of historical, social and cultural background that originated on a deep vision.

An ecote that you ignore could have a great social impact and a broad reflection. Beyond the official ideological discourse, it can prevent theoretical weakness giving place to case studies which could constitute a basis to the comparative analysis. Quest and orientation for legitimacy that are provided by present paradigmatic comfort can lead to remain the problems unsolved. In this article, we want to offer a global mirror which everyone could see himself clearly, by means of accommodation to different colors and perspectives even though they do not constitute real integrity. Even if we know it may not be easy to understand, we think that it will contribute to the solution. Hybrid models that suitable to become eclectic and synthetic ideologies could provide opportunity for cultural reading as an explanation methodology of the nature of nationalisms. As a result, nationalisms are even presented as a religious ritual, it

is clear that they are not divine and religious. In the period of transition from tradition to modernity, one of the great weakness point of the nationalism current is its effort on pretending to seen as a religious belief. Particularly this example true in the communities that have strong religious aspect. There are objective ways to evaluate that go beyond personal taste and nationalistic conditioned preferences. Predominantly nationalistic conditioned reflexes works as a multifunctional political tool in this type of societies. Many methods exist for diminishing nationalistic, conditioned aggression. One is to increase the ethos of peace and of peacemaker models. Tendency of being closed to criticism clinched this attitude. Discussing the problem areas should be preferred to monotype conformist tendencies in mind that based on rote-learning based education system, although it is difficult to overcome. Good learning and developing of skills is first step to get rid of complications of such difficulties. Moreover, in this matter there is no possibility to talk about a universal prototype.

‘Nationalism fever’ can burn the social environment with its complexity and crude experiences. It may not be enough to take precautions against this fire up. You might need to be ready to intervene with sensitivity as a firefighter at any moment. Contrary to that is believed, this intervention could be realized not with a rough and tough body language but with a constructive and comprehensive peace language. When we search the history of our country, we can draw conclusion that guide us. The first thing to be done is converting cultural common sense from the potential energy level to the kinetic energy level. As a humanitarian factor, activating some cultural facts (Adam and Eve and their children), we could recognize and build our union efforts starting from guidelines. By means of looking at the subject from a different and unique point of view, we may give an opportunity to a solution-oriented approach. We would like to emphasize that this article will be very useful background to revisit the nationalisms.

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